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Abstract
In the absence of perfect annuity markets, individual consumers generally undertake precautionary saving to
provide resources for their future consumption in the event that they live longer than expected. Kotlikoff,
Shoven, and Spivak (in this issue) (hereafter KSS) have provided us with a well-conceived and well-executed
study of the effects of various annuity arrangements on individual and aggregate saving in the presence of
lifetime uncertainty. Each of these authors has had a long-standing interest in this area, and their current paper
reflects their accumulated expertise. Their results indicate that a potentially sizable fraction of U.S. household
wealth represents precautionary saving resulting from the absence of perfect annuity market.
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 Comment on Kotlikoff, Shoven,
 and Spivak
 Andrew B. Abel, Harvard University and
 National Bureau of Economic Research
 In the absence of perfect annuity markets, individual consumers generally
 undertake precautionary saving to provide resources for their future
 consumption in the event that they live longer than expected. Kotlikoff,
 Shoven, and Spivak (in this issue) (hereafter KSS) have provided us with
 a well-conceived and well-executed study of the effects of various annuity
 arrangements on individual and aggregate saving in the presence of
 lifetime uncertainty. Each of these authors has had a long-standing
 interest in this area, and their current paper reflects their accumulated
 expertise. Their results indicate that a potentially sizable fraction of U.S.
 household wealth represents precautionary saving resulting from the
 absence of perfect annuity markets.
 The strategy of the KSS paper is to develop simple models of individual
 saving behavior on the basis of utility maximization and then to aggregate
 the behavior of individuals both intra- and intertemporally. By comparing
 the results of models that differ in the specification of bequest motives
 and opportunities for creating annuities, KSS provide insights about the
 effects of various annuity arrangements on saving and capital accumu-
 lation. Although the models are all conceptually simple, analytic solutions
 cannot be obtained in many cases. Therefore, KSS provide numerical
 solutions to their models. In addition, because the models are conceptually
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 simple, KSS are able to provide intuitive explanations for most of their
 findings.
 I. Bequest Motives
 The literature on uncertain lifetimes and bequests contains at least five
 different types of motives for leaving bequests. (a) There may be no
 motive for leaving bequests, but bequests may occur accidentally when
 a consumer, holding some precautionary saving, dies. Abel (1985) and
 Eckstein, Eichenbaum, and Peled (in press) have examined accidental
 bequests in overlapping generations economies. (b) Consumers may
 obtain utility directly from leaving a legacy at death. This utility can be
 simply written as a function of the size of the legacy at death, as in
 Yaari's (1965) seminal paper. (c) Consumers may have a "paternalistic"
 bequest motive in which they care not only about their own consumption
 but also about the consumption of their children. Goldman (1979),
 however, has shown that this formulation of the utility function leads
 to problems of dynamic inconsistency in the sense of Strotz (1956). (d)
 Consumers may obtain utility from their own consumption and from
 the utility of their heirs. Barro (1974) has termed this formulation an
 "altruistic" bequest motive. (e) Bequests may occur as the result of game-
 theoretic interactions among selfish consumers as in Kotlikoff, Shoven,
 and Spivak (1983) and Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (in this issue).
 In their paper, KSS have chosen to focus on models in which bequests
 arise because of either motive d or motive e. The exclusion of motives
 a, b, and c seems quite appropriate. The effects on individual saving and
 aggregate capital accumulation of introducing a perfect annuity market
 when bequests are entirely accidental (motive a) has already been studied
 elsewhere (Abel 1985). It is worth noting that, in contrast to the
 simulation results presented for the models in KSS, the introduction of
 a perfect annuity market into a model with only accidental bequests can
 lead to an increase in steady-state aggregate capital stock if the coefficient
 of relative risk aversion is below a certain critical value (which is less
 than one). Although motive b provides an analytically convenient
 formulation, this specification is often justified by claiming that it is a
 convenient way of capturing the fact that a consumer cares about the
 utility of his children, that is, motive d. (See, e.g., Sheshinski and Weiss
 1981.) Thus KSS seem quite justified in examining motive d and ignoring
 motive b. Finally, the exclusion of motive c seems warranted in the light
 of the dynamic consistency problems associated with it.
 II. An Alternative Interpretation of the Parameters
 of the Utility Function
 The KSS specification of the "intergenerationally altruistic" utility
 function differs from the conventional formulation based on Barro (1974).
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 In order to make this point clearly and to highlight the differences in
 interpretation of the preference parameters, I consider the special case
 in which all consumers live for 4 periods with certainty (i.e., P = 1 in
 the KSS notation). Let Wt denote the family's total wealth at the
 beginning of period t, and let ctj be the consumption in the ith period
 of life of a consumer born at the beginning of period t. Then the utility
 function in equation (2) of KSS can be written as
 V(Wt) = max[u(ct-2,3) + Ou(ct,l) + au(ct2,4) + OaU(ct,2) + c2V(Wt+2)], (1)
 where, in the KSS formulation, u( ) is a constant relative risk aversion
 utility function. Solving equation (1) recursively yields
 V(Wt) = max[u(ct2,3) + au(ct2,4) + c &2'U(Ct+2i)], (2a)
 5=o
 where
 U(CQ) = Ou(cJ,1) + OaU(c5,2) + a2U(c5,3) + a3U(C5,4);
 s=t,t+2,t+4, ... (2b)
 Before interpreting the utility function in equation (2), recall that, in the
 Barro formulation of the utility function, a consumer obtains utility
 from the utility of his heir(s) as well as directly from his own consumption.
 A convenient specification of this utility function is
 Vt*(Wt) = max[U*(Ct) + jt Vt*+d(Wt+d)], (3)
 where Ct is the vector of lifetime consumption by the consumer born at
 the beginning of period t, U*(Ct) is the utility that the consumer obtains
 directly from his own consumption, Wt is the wealth held at birth by a
 consumer born at the beginning of period t, and d is the number of
 periods between the birth of successive generations. The parameter t
 can be interpreted as t = (1 + g)-1, where p is the rate of preference
 (per period) of a consumer for the utility of his own consumption over
 the utility of his heir. Time preference per se is embodied in the function
 U*(Ct). Solving (3) recursively yields
 Vt*(Wt) = max Z TdiU *(Ct+i) (4)
 i=o
 Now consider the case in which consumers live for 4 periods and in
 which d = 2. As of time t, the consumer born at time t - 2 maximizes
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 U *(t-2,1, Ct-2,2, Ct-2,3, Ct-2,4) + 7C2 1 I.L2iU*(Ct+2i)3 (5)
 i=o
 where the bar under Ct2,1 and Ct2,2 indicates that these two consumption
 levels already have been chosen.
 We can now interpret the parameters in the KSS utility function (my
 eq. [1]) by recalling that (1) is equivalent to (2) and then observing that
 the right-hand side of (2) is a special case of (5). In equation (5), t is the
 discount factor (per period) that a consumer applies to the utility of his
 heir. A comparison of (2) and (5) reveals that a plays the same role as t
 and thus measures the discounting due to the preference for one's own
 consumption over the utility of one's child. This interpretation differs
 from the KSS interpretation of a as the "time preference factor."
 The rate of time preference relating the utility of one's own consumption
 at different dates is not constant in the KSS formulation. The discount
 factor reflecting time preference for first-period consumption relative to
 second-period consumption is a, for second-period consumption relative
 to third-period consumption is a/0, and for third-period consumption
 relative to fourth-period consumption is a. If we impose the restriction
 that the rate of time preference is always nonnegative or, equivalently,
 that the discount factor never exceeds one, then a must be less than or
 equal to 0.
 Interpreting a as a measure of the bequest motive rather than as a
 measure of time preference does not, of course, invalidate the KSS
 numerical simulation results, although it does indicate that a different
 set of parameters may be considered the "most relevant." More important,
 the KSS assertion that (with perfect insurance), in the steady state, R,
 defined as [1 + f'(k)]-1, where f'(k) is the marginal product of capital, is
 equal to a continues to hold true under the interpretation proposed
 above that a reflects the preference for one's own consumption over
 one's heir's utility. Indeed, Samuelson (1968) derived his well-known
 Two-Part Golden Rule using the utility function (4) (with d = 1) and
 found that, with a constant population, the steady state is characterized
 by the equality of the marginal product of capital and the rate of
 preference for one generation over the succeeding generation; the "long-
 run equilibrium is quite independent of the subjective time preference
 of the representative individual during his own lifetime" (p. 89). More
 recently, Burbridge (1983) has used a recursive specification similar to
 (3) and also obtained the result that the marginal product of capital is
 equal to the discount rate applied to the utility of the succeeding
 generation. Although Samuelson and Burbridge ignored the uncertainty
 of the date of death, this result continues to hold with lifetime uncertainty
 if there are perfect insurance and annuity markets.
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 III. The Distribution of Wealth
 The stochastic nature of the date of death leads to a nondegenerate
 distribution of wealth even if all consumers are identical ex ante.
 Although all consumers have the same ex ante mortality probabilities,
 some consumers in each generation die young and some consumers die
 old. In the absence of perfect annuity markets, consumers who die at
 different ages will in general leave bequests of different sizes. Therefore,
 the inheritances received by members of subsequent generations will
 depend on the mortality history of their families, and there will be a
 nondegenerate cross-sectional distribution of wealth. In Section II, KSS
 present an intriguing result for the distribution of wealth in an economy
 populated by consumers with intergenerational altruism. They show
 that, if consumers are allowed to borrow against their own future income
 and the future income of their heirs, then the distribution of income in
 the absence of an annuity market tends toward complete inequality.
 More precisely, they show that, with probability one, the wealth of a
 given family will be zero in the long run; all the economy's wealth is
 held by families in a set of measure zero. On reading this result, two
 questions occur to the reader. First, why? Second, how might the model
 be reasonably altered to get rid of this result? To both of these questions
 KSS provide excellent answers. I offer an alternative interpretation below.
 The result that with probability one a family will have zero wealth in
 the long run bears a striking similarity to the gambler's-ruin problem in
 which, with probability one, a gambler facing a series of fair bets will
 go broke. In the KSS model one can view the family as facing a series
 of bets on whether the 3-period-old consumer will end up living 3 or 4
 periods. If the consumer dies after the third period, the family wins an
 amount (D - 1)W, > 0, but if the consumer lives after the third period,
 the family "wins" an amount (A - 1)W, < 0. The expected payoff from
 this bet is [(1 - P)(D - 1) + P(A - 1)]W,, which, according to equation
 (7) in KSS, is equal to zero. Thus each bet faced by the family is fair.
 One can interpret the KSS result as a demonstration that a gambler who
 always wagers a constant share of his wealth at a given set of fair odds
 will go broke with probability one.
 By altering the model of Section II to prohibit consumers from
 borrowing against future income, KSS are able to eliminate the complete
 inequality result. Using the terminology of the gambler's-ruin problem,
 it is clear that prohibiting the gambler from mortgaging his future
 income prevents him from ever going broke. (The gambler's-ruin logic
 of the previous paragraph also breaks down in this case because it is no
 longer true that every bet of every family has zero expected value. In
 the steady state it is true that the expected [= actual] value of aggregate
 wealth 2 periods hence is always equal to current aggregate wealth.
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 However, for some families expected wealth 2 periods hence exceeds
 their current wealth, and for some families expected wealth 2 periods
 hence is less than their current wealth.)
 IV. Implications for Policy
 Although the focus of the KSS paper is not on government policy,
 the issues discussed are of concern to policymakers, and KSS offer some
 remarks on policy. They point out that their results imply that the
 insurance aspects of social security may reduce the long-run capital stock
 by even more than the "pay-as-you-go" aspect. While this observation
 may indeed be correct, one must note the following important difference
 between the provision of annuities through the social security system
 and the provision of annuities through the market: because the actuarially
 fair rate of return exceeds the rate of return on riskless bonds (if RB is
 the gross rate of return on riskless bonds, and if P is the probability of
 survival, then the actuarially fair gross rate of return on annuities is
 RB/P), the introduction of a private annuity market raises the rate of
 return on private savings, and the increase in the rate of return has both
 income and substitution effects. However, even if social security could
 offer the same rate of return as the private annuity market (and indeed
 a fully funded system could offer the actuarially fair rate of return
 without running a deficit or a surplus), the introduction of social security
 would differ from the introduction of a private annuity market because
 there is no substitution effect associated with the introduction of social
 security. If the rate of return on social security is greater than the rate
 on riskless bonds, then the introduction of social security would have a
 positive income effect. However, because consumers cannot individually
 choose how much saving to hold in the form of social security, there is
 no substitution effect associated with the higher rate of return on saving
 offered by social security. Put differently, the introduction of social
 security does not change a consumer's intertemporal terms of trade.
 Thus one must be cautious in applying results about the effects of private
 annuities to questions concerning the introduction of social security.
 Sheshinski and Weiss (1981) have proposed an optimal social security
 system in the presence of lifetime uncertainty in which the government
 establishes a social security system to provide the amount of annuities
 that private consumers would choose if there were a competitive annuity
 market. However, the design of an optimal social security system is
 easier in the Sheshinski-Weiss model because they assume that all
 consumers in a given cohort die at the same time, thereby eliminating
 intracohort variation in bequests and wealth. In the KSS model, there is
 intracohort variation in wealth so that different consumers in a given
 cohort would demand different amounts of social security. This feature
 of the model (and of the world) complicates the design of an optimal
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 social security system because consumers who are alive when the social
 security system is introduced would not agree on the appropriate amount
 of social security coverage.
 Because the introduction of a perfect annuity market generally reduces
 the steady-state capital stock, it also reduces steady-state aggregate
 consumption (provided that the marginal product of capital exceeds the
 population growth rate). It is possible, KSS point out, that in the steady
 state the consumption of every consumer may be lower in the presence
 of an annuity market than in its absence. This apparently paradoxical
 result serves to remind us that, in evaluating the effects of policy, we
 may not want to focus simply on the steady state but may want also to
 consider the welfare of consumers on the transition path to the new
 steady state. In the selfish life-cycle model, the policymaker would have
 to prescribe a social welfare function that weights the utility of consumers
 in different generations. Using the social welfare function analyzed by
 Samuelson (1968) leads to the modified Golden Rule in which steady-
 state aggregate consumption is lower than its maximum feasible value.
 Finally, if we are to examine the desirability of the government's
 provision of annuities, then it would be useful to include in the model
 the reason(s) that annuities are not provided by the market. For instance,
 if consumers have different ex ante mortality probabilities, then adverse
 selection could be sufficiently severe to preclude the operation of a
 private market for annuities. A compulsory system of annuities (such as
 social security) would be immune to adverse selection. To evaluate the
 desirability of social security, the model would have to include the
 heterogeneity and adverse selection that gave rise to the possible desir-
 ability of social security in the first place, as in Abel (1984).
 At the close of their paper, KSS provide a brief agenda for future
 research on the aggregate implications of individual lifetime uncertainty
 and precautionary saving. In addition to analyzing the effects of uncer-
 tainty with respect to future health status and future earnings, it would
 be of interest to analyze the effects of uncertainty of future government
 policy. For instance, social security may have very different effects,
 depending on consumers' assessments of the likelihood that the social
 security system will be able to deliver its promised benefits when current
 young consumers are old. More generally, future research might usefully
 examine the effects of aggregate uncertainty as well as individual
 uncertainty. We already have learned a great deal about precautionary
 saving, capital accumulation, and the distribution of wealth from Kotlikoff,
 Shoven, and Spivak. Their future research should continue to deepen
 our understanding of these topics.
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